Pentest and investigate code and live applications, test security hypotheses, and document findings with AI.
Find vulnerabilities. Prove their impact.
A suspicion becomes a finding when the workspace can show the impact.
Decide what is worth investigating from the code, the running application, and the traffic. The workspace holds those three views together so the scope of the research is explicit.
Form a hypothesis, run the tests, and read the results in the same thread. You stay in the loop: the AI proposes the next check, you see what came back.
Each finding keeps the reproduction steps and the proof of impact. A written suspicion stays a hypothesis until the responses, or the code, show what actually happened.
The workspace is built for this loop: name the suspicion, run it against the live application, compare what came back, and file the finding with that evidence.
“This endpoint might skip an authorization check.” The order id in the path is the thing to test.
Request the same order as the owner, then again as a second account that should not see it.
Status codes and bodies sit side by side. A match is the impact: the second account read the first account’s order.
Both requests, both responses, and the diff become the finding. The write-up can be reproduced from the workspace.
Security research jumps between a repository, a running target, and the requests in between. Trusteed keeps the terminal, the proxy, the source, the hypotheses, and the evidence on one surface so the investigation does not fragment across tools.
Follow a suspicion from code or traffic through a live check, and keep the notes next to the result.
Investigate an endpoint with the repository, the running app, and the proxy in the same workspace.
Turn a possible issue into a finding that shows reproduction steps and the impact on a real response.
Blog
An AI agent read the HTTP/2 spec and wrote an exploit that exhausts 32 GB of server RAM in ten seconds — from one connection, with zero authentication. Apache, nginx, IIS, Envoy, and Pingora are all affected, and public PoC code is live.
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CopyFail (CVE-2026-31431) gives root with a 732-byte script and no disk writes, invisible to disk-based FIM. A week later, Dirty Frag (CVE-2026-43284 / CVE-2026-43500) bypassed the CopyFail mitigation entirely by exploiting ESP and RxRPC instead of algif_aead. Both are actively exploited, both have public PoCs, and the standard modprobe blacklist does not work on RHEL-family distros.
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Enterprises run separate GRC, ASM, and vulnerability management tools that cannot share evidence or context. Consolidating them into one platform cuts manual evidence collection and makes 72- and 96-hour regulatory reporting possible.
Read MoreRead MoreThe AI Red Team & Security Research Workspace. Start with a hypothesis on code or a live application, and leave with a finding that carries its evidence.
